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Purpose: The objectives of this study were to analyse certain aspects of the Board 
composition of Maltese listed companies (MLCs), namely Board size, independence, 
expertise, gender diversity and the chairperson/CEO links, and  how these may be improved. 
Design/Approach/Methodology: The study was designed around a qualitative approach of 
data collection. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seventeen participants, 
consisting of fourteen company secretaries of MLCs, a representative of the Maltese 
regulator, a corporate advisor and a corporate lawyer. 
Findings: The nomination and appointment process of directors in MLCs relies mainly on 
networking, with a tendency to continuously appoint the same tried network of directors. 
This creates a barrier towards new talent being introduced into boardrooms. A general 
disagreement also persists as to what constitutes a truly independent Board member.  
Practical Implications: Practical experience often supplants academic qualifications when 
nominating and appointing directors. Moreover, female representation on the Boards of 
MLCs is still lacking. Notwithstanding the fact that the importance of having separate 
chairperson/CEO roles is acknowledged, there is likely to be strong resistance to any law 
rendering this mandatory.   
Originality/Value: Studies relating to the composition of the Board of Directors in smaller 
states such as the island state of Malta are infrequent. This paper provides information that 
is of particular value to listed companies in smaller states and their stakeholders, including 
regulators and sheds more light on the priniciple of proportionailty when dealing with 
requirements imposed by the authorities. 
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Corporate Boards are at the pinnacle of every company and play a pivotal role in any 
corporate governance (‘CG’) system (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), thereby making 
them the focal point of various efforts to improve CG (Boone et al., 2006). In fact, 
CG codes and governance professionals have long addressed the composition of the 
board of directors (the ‘Board’), suggesting ways in which this can be improved to 
allow Boards to be more effectual governance agents (Monks and Minow, 2011). 
 
This research paper critically ascertains and analyses five aspects of board 
composition of Maltese Listed Companies (‘MLCs’), namely board size, board 
independence, board expertise, gender diversity, and the chairperson/chief 
executive officer (‘CEO’) links. The study is conducted in Malta, a small island 
state in the European Union. It raises awareness on the need of improving CG 
practices relating to Board composition among Maltese listed companies. It also 
provides relevant suggestions assisting those in charge of CG in changing their 
practices and thus achieving stronger, more effective boards. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Board composition is a fundamental consideration in the corporate governance 
structure of a company, particularly as it influences the directors’ capability of 
safeguarding shareholder interests.  The function of the Board must therefore be 
underpinned by an appropriate Board composition. This study focuses on the 
aforementioned five aspects of Board composition within the context of the Maltese 
Companies Act (‘CA’) 1995 and the Maltese Code of Principles of Corporate 
Governance (the ‘Code’).  
 
2.1 Board Size 
 
The Board must be of an adequate size, such that the level of skills and experience is 
suitable for the entity’s needs. Therefore, the optimal size of the Board shall vary on 
a firm-by-firm basis, depending on the firm’s characteristics (MFSA, 2011). 
However, according to the Maltese CA1995, the number of Board members of a 
public company should not be less than two (Laws of Malta, 1995).  
 
Numerous academics (Kim et al., 2010; Lehn et al., 2009) affirm that Boards of a 
smaller size function more effectually than Boards of a larger size because of the 
high co-ordination expenses and free-rider issues linked to larger Boards. 
Furthermore, with larger Boards, there is a tendency for individual directors to 
presume that the many other directors are monitoring. In contrast, directors in 
smaller Boards tend to make a greater effort than they otherwise would, since there 
would be few other directors overseeing the company (Kim et al., 2010). Smaller 
Boards also facilitate communication and decision-making among the directors and 
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enable them to have more effectual and candid deliberations. This makes it easier to 
reach consensus (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
 
On the other hand, larger Boards are thought to have better and increased 
information and access to resources (Lehn et al., 2009) as collectively Board 
members possess more knowledge and skills. Moreover, Boards of a larger size tend 
to provide better and impartial counsel to senior management. Therefore, larger 
Boards enhance both the monitoring and advisory role of the Board (Cohen et al., 
2002). Furthermore, unlike smaller Boards, larger ones are dominated less easily 
(Anand, 2007).  
 
2.2 Board Independance 
 
Directors may be classified as either executive directors (‘EDs’), non-executive 
directors (‘NEDs’), or independent non-executive directors (‘INEDs’) (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2000). EDs are those directors who are also managers, officers or 
employees of the organisation (Anand, 2007). On the other hand, NEDs are directors 
who are not linked to the company’s daily management and who are not employed 
by the company (Caruana, 2017). NEDs may be further categorised as independent 
or non-independent. Independent directors do not have any close relations with the 
company and are mainly inducted for their abilities and skills. Non-independent 
directors have a close relationship with the organisation, despite not forming part of 
management or being employees of the company (Anand, 2007). 
 
The Code recommends that Boards should involve a mixture of “executive and non-
executive directors, including independent non-executives”, whose independence is 
to be ascertained by the Board (MFSA, 2011). However, being based on the comply-
or-explain principle, the Code gives companies the flexibility not to adhere to such a 
recommendation.  
 
Customarily, the concept of Board independence has been understood as a 
prerequisite for the Board to be able to provide effective and impartial oversight 
(Ringe, 2013) since INEDs are less vulnerable to capture by management (Gordon, 
2006). However, the term ‘independence’ lacks a clear definition (Ringe, 2013). 
Furthermore, despite the increasing importance given to independent Board 
members, studies indicate a shortage of INEDs, both in Malta (Sant, 2003) and 
abroad (Chen and Moers, 2018). It is hard to find individuals who are completely 
and explicitly independent of the company’s management (Kim et al., 2010). 
Secondly, given the various responsibilities assigned to INEDs, their incentive 
structure is quite weak. This potentially reduces the number of individuals who are 
willing to fill directorship positions. Furthermore, high scrutiny from third parties, 
such as shareholders and regulators, has discouraged INEDS from taking on too 
many directorships in order to ensure that they have adequate time to dedicate to the 
workload arising from their existing directorships (Chen and Moers, 2018). On the 
other hand, others claim that the main problem is the lack of skill as opposed to the 
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absolute independence of Board members (Davies and Hopt, 2013). Some even 
claim that INEDs may be too independent to comprehend the intricacies of the 
company which they are supposed to monitor (Nordberg, 2011). Sheer independence 
without knowledge regarding the entity’s operations is undoubtedly improper 
(Gordon, 2006).  
 
2.3 Board Expertise  
  
The best way to manage the disruption experienced by companies today (EY, 2016) 
and to gain competitive advantage (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000) is to harness the 
power of different ideas from diverse groups of people (EY, 2016). To this effect, 
the Maltese Code recommends that the Board should ascertain that it is composed of 
a “diversity of knowledge, judgment and experience” (MFSA, 2011).  
 
Boards can only fulfil their duties effectively and efficiently if they are properly 
qualified (O’Sullivan, 2009). A Board should be composed of different professional 
expertise to ensure that it fully comprehends all matters (European Commission, 
2011). Additionally, qualified directors are also able to come up with resourceful 
and insightful ideas as well as to provide distinctive views (Cox and Blake, 1991). 
Inadequate Board qualifications lead to a lack of objectivity and critical thinking 
(Gaur et al., 2015; Pace et al., 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, despite its importance, the CA does not specify any minimum 
qualifications or experience that the directors should possess (Bezzina et al., 2014b; 
Camilleri et al., 2019). Consequently, any individual may serve as a director 
(Mifsud, 2008). In fact, Azzopardi (2012) found that in Malta, Board members are 
selected on the basis of integrity and experience, rather than academic qualifications. 
This is troubling considering the widely recognised adversity of managing 
organisations and the possible consequences to creditors of an organisation 
incompetently managed by its directors (Muscat, 2007). However, the requirement 
of qualifications, whether academic or otherwise, would be impracticable to the 
point of being virtually impossible to implement and enforce (Muscat, 2007; 
Mazreku et al., 2018). 
  
Nonetheless, the Code compels Board members of MLCs to be “fit and proper”. 
This requirement is mandatory for companies operating in the financial services 
(Muscat, 2007). A fit and proper person shall have the personal traits, such as a good 
repute (“proper”), and the professional qualifications, competence, knowledge and 
experience (“fit”), required for such individual to be able to adequately fulfil the 
duties and obligations attached to a director’s role (MFSA, 2015).  
 
2.4 Gender Diversity 
 
Corporate Boards are experiencing increasing pressure to appoint women. Females 
expand the expertise at the disposal of the management of the organisation 
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(European Commission, 2011) since by considering females, companies are 
accessing wider talent pools for Board members (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Evidence also suggests that Boards which are diversified in terms of gender carry 
out better oversight (Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013) and are more inclined to hold 
CEOs responsible, thereby improving the company’s governance framework 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Furthermore, females tend to be more autonomous 
(Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013) since they are not part of the “old boys club” 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and regularly attend Board meetings (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), thereby compelling enhanced attendance by males (Mishra and 
Jhunjhunwala, 2013).  
 
Nonetheless, despite the extensive literature highlighting the benefits of gender 
diversity, the Maltese Code does not address gender diversity at Board level. This 
could be a major reason why Malta has the lowest presence of females in Boards 
when compared to other EU countries, amounting to only 5% (European 
Commission, 2016).  
 
However, even globally, corporations have been slow to appreciate the capabilities 
of females, barring support roles (Singh, 2005), such as human resources and 
customer care (Higgs, 2003). This is partly because leaders tend to appoint 
individuals who are similar to them. As a result, Board members have become type-
casted as male (Singh, 2005). Another reason which prevents women from climbing 
the corporate ladder is that they generally have greater childcare responsibilities, 
which usually results in them having less experience because of the higher tendency 
towards career breaks and reduced working hours. This will likewise deter women 
from promotions.  
 
Other obstacles include the absence of female predecessors and role models showing 
that females can occupy such roles and be successful in boardrooms, and that such 
positions are open to women (Ford and Rohini, 2011). Comparably, the appointment 
of directors often relies on networks of existing directors, who are generally males. 
Consequently, another reason which impedes women’s presence on Boards is the 
difficulty experienced by potential female directors when accessing networking 
opportunities (Lord Davies of Abersoch, 2011).  
 
2.5 The Chairperson/CEO links 
 
The chairperson is responsible for the leadership of the Board (Kakabadse et al., 
2010), while the CEO is responsible for the leadership of the firm (Lorsch and 
Zelleke, 2005).  Following recent corporate scandals, regulators are continuously 
demanding that the roles of the chairperson and CEO are held by different persons 
(Wilson, 2009) so as to ensure that the Board is independent from the company’s 
management (Lorsch and Zelleke, 2005).  
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In the absence of such independence, and because of the concentration of power 
emanating from combining the two roles, the Board will not be able to carry out its 
oversight and control function effectively (Duke and Kankpang, 2011). Evidently, 
the Maltese Code proposes that the roles of the chairperson and CEO should be 
separate to ensure that no one person has “unfettered powers of discretion” (MFSA, 
2011). Yet, it permits the combination of the two roles so long as a justification is 
given to the market and the organisation’s stakeholders (Baldacchino, 2017).   
 
The Code also considers the fact that in certain circumstances, combining the two 
roles may be inevitable (MFSA, 2011), a situation referred to as chairperson/CEO 
duality (Baldacchino, 2017). Proponents of chairperson/CEO duality claim that there 
should only be one boss (Baldacchino, 2013), otherwise the chairperson would 
simply be a figure-head, or else would overpower the CEO (Monks and Minow, 
2011). Therefore, chairperson/CEO duality eliminates possible conflicts and power 
struggles between the chairperson and CEO (Solomon, 2013). Moreover, 
chairperson/CEO duality allows the chairperson/CEO to administer and coordinate 
the Board’s deliberations more competently and efficiently as s/he has a broader 
range of information and awareness (Solomon, 2013). 
 
The chairperson may hold an executive or non-executive role (NACD, 2017). The 
Code and the King Committee on Corporate Governance (2016) recommend an 
independent non-executive chair since such a role reinforces Board independence, 
and allows a more effective assessment of the CEO (Jensen, 1993). A non-executive 
chair also increases the likelihood that the chair will perform his/her role effectively, 
and not stray away to matters concerned with the daily management of the company 
(Wilson, 2008). On the other hand, an executive chair may provide valuable benefits 
to the Board as s/he is more knowledgeable about the organisation’s limitations and 
opportunities and has access to critical information about the organisation’s 
operations and its business environment (Raheja, 2005).  
 
The CEO may either be a Board member, a regular ex-officio participant, or a Board 
participant only upon invitation (Lieu, 2016). Those in favour of the CEO serving as 
a Board member assert that this provides the CEO with greater integrity and 
authority within the company and leads to better informed decisions since the CEO 
can provide inside information on the company. On the other hand, those against the 
CEO being a Board member argue that this is essential in keeping the management 
role distinct from the governance role.  
 
However, in such cases, the CEO should still attend Board meetings (Council on 
Foundations, 2010). In this respect, some contend that the CEO should be normally 
asked to attend all Board meetings, while others argue that the chairperson should 
attend only upon invitation and for specific meetings, if not only upon specific 
matters (Lieu, 2016). In any case, it is important for conflicts of interest arising from 
the presence of the CEO, to be avoided, such as for instance, when the Board is 
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setting the CEO’s remuneration, or evaluating the CEO’s performance (Council on 
Foundations, 2010).  
 
3. Research Methodology  
 
3.1 The Research Tool  
 
The research tool deemed to be most appropriate for achieving the research 
objectives of this study was the scheduled semi-structured interview which was 
prepared after reviewing the literature summarised above to be used as a guide in 
order to ensure that all the questions and topics, which are required to properly 
address the research areas, are covered (Harrell and Bradley, 2009). The study is 
therefore predominantly a qualitative one where information is required directly 
from those experiencing the phenomenon under investigation.  Since the interviews 
were semi-structured in nature, they provided interviewees with the opportunity to 
respond to the interview questions as they desired, whilst they enabled the researcher 
inquire further and obtain a deep understanding of the rationale of participants. 
Moreover, since all interviewees were probed with the same questions, the data 
gathered could be compared and statistically analysed (McIntosh and Morse, 2015).  
 
The interview schedule prepared for the purpose of this study, which comprised a 
combination of closed-ended and open-ended questions, was aimed towards equity 
MLCs and Corporate Governance Experts (‘CGEs’). A five-point Likert scale, with 
‘1’ being strongly disagree and ‘5’ being strongly agree, was used for the closed-
ended questions.  
 
3.2 The Sample Choice  
 
The use of Malta as the case for this study follows the ideals of various prominent 
researchers such as Bezzina et al. (2012), Bezzina et al. (2014a), Briguglio (1995), 
King (1993) and Magri et al. (2019), who used islands and  small states, as small 
scale laboratories for more complex politics, regulations and policies of larger 
countries. Moreover, this study enables us understand whether the principle of 
proportionality incorporated in the EU Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Article 3b, 1 and 4 work 
(Xuereb et al., 2019).  
 
3.3 The Sample Population  
 
The selection of the research population is fundamental to every study (Martínez-
Mesa et al., 2016). Company secretaries (‘COSECs’) of MLCs were chosen as the 
target population for the study since they participate extensively in the CG function 
of MLCs and are fairly acquainted with the provisions of the Code. Fourteen 
interviews were conducted with COSECs, representing eighteen different MLCs 
(since two of the interviewees occupied the secretarial role for more than one MLC) 
out of a total of twenty four Maltese Equity-Listed Companies as at 31st March 
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2019. Three other interviews were also carried out with CGEs, including a 
representative of the Malta Financial Services Authority (‘MFSA’), a corporate 
advisor and a corporate lawyer; their participation was deemed to be important to 
obtain a more comprehensive analysis of the research topic.  The interviewees for 
this study included a combination of company secretaries, professionals working in 
the financial services industry and the Maltese financial regulator.  The researchers 
have therefore sought to  select the most relevant data sources to collect their 
research findings, and this within the context of Malta, being a small island state 
within a limited number of listed companies.   
 
Therefore, interviewees with past experience or who were experiencing the 
phenomena under study were selected with the objective of gathering the most 
relevant and enriching data pertinent to the research area. The interviews where 
deemed to be conclusive when reaching saturation (Guest et al., 2006; Mason 2010; 
Morse 1995).  
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
Qualitative data was gathered through the open-ended questions included in the 
interview schedule.  The researchers also probed further into the participants’ 
rationale by asking them to elaborate further on the reasons for the responses given, 
thereby focusing on the participants’ understanding on the subject matter under 
investigation.  The interviews were duly transcribed and the responses were then 
examined using the thematic approach (Braun et al., 2006) to analyse the similarities 
and disparities in the responses given.  
 
3.5 Limitations and Significance of the Study  
 
Although every effort has been made to conduct a comprehensive study on the 
subject matter, it remains that the study is subject to a few of limitations. Firstly, all 
participants in the study were Maltese and the findings of the study are therefore 
limited to Malta. However, this was the scope of the study so as to udnerstand how 
the principle of proportionailty in applying and imposing requirements works in 
smaller EU jurisdictions (below the 3 million population).  
 
Moreover, validity of the data as noted above was achieved at the saturation point by 
means of the fourteen interviews conducted with the COSECs, representing eighteen 
different MLCs, duly keeping in view that the interviewees comprised the most 
significant and relevant officers within the limited number of Maltese listed 
companies. Finally, in this study, emphasis was only placed on aspects of Board 
composition which were deemed to be more important. In particular, the element of 
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4. Findings and Discussion 
 
An effective Board is to include an appropriate balance of a number of aspects, each 
of which plays its part in determining the overall suitability and relevance of such 
Board in governing a company. This may be closely analogous to the appropriate 
ingredients one is to include in a well-baked cake.  
 
4.1 The First Ingrement: The Right Board Size 
  
4.1.1 Small vs large boards: Efficiency vs extensiveness? 
The research findings indicate that the majority of respondents (11) believed that 
smaller Boards make it easier hold discussions. Some respondents (3) argued that it 
was also easier to reach a quorum with a smaller board.  Yet, one participant (1) 
considered that such Board size is no longer considered relevant when the directors 
present a highly convincing argument.  Moreover, it was considered by most 
respondents (10) that it was easier to reach consensus in smaller Boards. This is 
because, with fewer Board members, there is less possibility of conflict or 
disagreement. However, some interviewees (7) opined that the ease with which 
consensus is reached does not solely depend on the number of the Board members, 
but equally on the personalities of the directors themselves.  
 
On the other hand, in line with the findings of Lehn et al. (2009) and Cohen et al. 
(2002), most interviewees (13) argued that larger MLC Boards are often better able 
to carry out their monitoring and advisory roles, because such Boards usually have a 
more extensive range of skills, providing for different perspectives and superior 
access to resources. However, a number of respondents (6) took the position that this 
is not always the case as the Board’s ability to properly carry out its functions does 
not depend merely on the number of Board members, but also, and sometimes even 
more importantly, on the quality of the Board members themselves.  
 
4.1.2 A perennial question: What is an appropriate board size? 
The Maltese regulatory framework does not exact a maximum number to the Board 
of any public entity, and the only relevant proviso in the Code is that “the Board 
should not be so large as to be unwieldy”. Indeed, the majority of respondents(14) 
were against the introduction of any Board capping as this would be tantamount to a 
rigid one-size-fits-all legal requirement for MLCs. On the other hand, without any 
specific legal guidance at all, difficulties will linger as to how, when and who is to 
determine such number in each MLC.  
 
Boards may turn out to be too large or too small, unless the appropriate criteria for 
deciding size are taken into consideration. These criteria are to revolve around the 
particular circumstances of each company, and may include considerations of its 
industry, the spread of its shareholders, its competitors and markets, and the 
resulting skillsets. Company promoters and, later, those in charge of CG, need to 
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ensure that the number of directors is and remains a fitting and balanced one even as 
the company progresses.  
 
4.2 The Second Ingredient: Board Independence 
 
4.2.1 Is the Board sufficiently balanced? What are the different types of directors? 
In line with the Code, Anand (2007) and Caruana (2017) contend that an ED is one 
who is involved in the daily operations of a company, while a NED is one who is not 
so involved. However, the CA (1995) does not address such difference. In fact, some 
respondents(6) contended that the distinction between EDs and NEDs is not always a 
black-and-white issue. In particular, the distinction starts to become a grey area in 
respect of non-executive directors and the extent to which they may involve 
themselves in company activities without being deemed to be executive. A proper 
legal definition could eliminate any such ambiguity in distinguishing between EDs 
and NEDs, if such a definition includes some additional criteria to that of mere 
involvement in the day-to-day running of the organisation.  
 
A number of respondents(6) found the distinction between NEDs and INEDs to be 
even more vague. In this respect, Kim et al. (2010) argue that the determination of 
the independence of directors is difficult as the exact criteria have not been found. In 
fact, both the Code and Listing Rules merely provide a non-exhaustive list of 
situations which are to be considered when determining director independence. 
Consequently, as stated by one CGE(1), directors may be deemed to be independent 
“even in situations when they are clearly not so”. It may therefore be a matter of 
tightening up the legal framework so that it provides more clarity without becoming 
too prescriptive. If it is difficult to establish detailed criteria, one may rather choose 
to set out more examples of practical situations and case studies to help the proper 
ascertainment of the independence or otherwise of a Board member. For example, 
may additional remuneration earned in relation to the job of a director, such as that 
earned from being part of a Board sub-committee, be deemed to impair 
independence? If so, at what point may such additional remuneration become 
significant or material?  
 
4.2.2 Executive, non-executive or independent directors?  
In line with the Code recommendations on Board composition, almost all 
interviewees(16) agreed that the Board needs to be composed of both EDs and NEDs 
if it is to have an adequate mix of Board members. In their view, having a balance of 
EDs and NEDs helps the Board to be equipped with the relevant inside and outside 
knowledge, objectivity and skills that are necessary to monitor, advise and formulate 
strategy. However, as Muscat (2007) pointed out, the Code did, and as yet does not 
establish any mechanism to ensure that both EDs and NEDs form part of the Board. 
Although the Board is responsible for the appointment of EDs, an appropriate 
ED/NED mix is difficult to obtain because one can hardly find executives who are 
both able and willing to sit on Boards. In this respect, one may argue that inviting 
executives as participants of Board meetings may be enough, as they will still be in a 
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position to share their knowledge and insights with their Board. Yet, mere 
participation may lead to executives not being held fully responsible and accountable 
for their actions or for any resulting decisions made by their Board.  
 
The Code further recommends that at least one-third of the Board is to be made up 
of NEDs, most of whom are to be independent. This is to help the Board ensure that 
its decision-making is not dominated by any member, given that, as stated by 
Gordon (2006), NEDs, and particularly INEDs, are less vulnerable to capture by 
management. However, a few of the respondents(4) noted that ensuring the right 
balance with one-third of the members being NEDs or INEDs probably remains 
questionable.  
 
4.2.3 How clear are the attributes of an independent Board member? 
An INED is to have a number of attributes. All interviewees (17) maintained that the 
most important attribute is the ability to think autonomously from the other directors 
on the Board. Yet, such an attribute - symptomatic of real independence of mind - is 
not specifically referred to anywhere in the Maltese regulatory framework.  
 
Another attribute found to be important by most interviewees(14), and possibly even 
more relevant within this small country context, is that an INED is to have no 
business or family relationship with the company. While in the case of such an 
attribute the Code makes a specific reference, yet the definition of what a prohibited 
business or family relationship would actually consist of remains lacking. While 
previous research, such as that of Baldacchino (2017) has forwarded some examples, 
more research in this area would be helpful, as it is not a matter of simply emulating 
the position taken by other larger countries. 
 
These clarifications may be even more enlightening if they are made in conjunction 
with regulatory requirements such as that of Boards having to delegate the 
classification of each Board member to independent consultants to determine 
whether they are NED or INED. Thus, this would further ensure the ascertainment 
of the attributes of a truly independent director without any possibility of conflict of 
interest. 
 
4.2.4 Is the present twelve-year tenure period too rigid? 
The majority of respondents (12)  agreed that, as the Code and Listing Rules 
stipulate, in ascertaining the independence or otherwise of a director, the tenure of a 
director (set at a threshold of twelve years) needs also to be taken into consideration. 
Yet, there are clear indications that a number of long tenures actually persist in 
MLCs. Could it be that the present Code recommendation of a maximum director 
tenure of twelve years is not always practicable? While such a fixed upper limit may 
normally seem to be reasonable, it is probably more acceptable for Board tenures to 
be set within a maximum range of five years, for instance, such as between seven 
and twelve years. Any tenure not adhering within such range may then be made 
compulsorily subject to published detailed justification. Clearly, as has already been 
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suggested by the literature with respect to other CG measures, it is far from enough 
to have such maximum tenure being merely recommended by the Code. At the same 
time, the flexibility provided by the upper limit range helps towards ensuring that 
there is no shortage of members suitable to satisfy the independence criteria.   
 
4.2.5 Is the small-country golden boy network to be tackled? 
In their study, Chen and Moers (2018) found that the shortage of INEDs has been 
caused by the high scrutiny of shareholders which has discouraged independent 
directors from holding multiple directorships. In this study, most interviewees (11) 
instead indicated that a major factor restricting the number of INEDs is the 
widespread preference by shareholders and different companies for the “golden 
boys”, thereby resulting in the incidence of multiple directorships. The same 
interviewees argued that multiple directorships may easily give rise to conflicts of 
interest and may discourage other persons from showing interest in directorship 
roles as they often perceive the situation as competing against an already established 
network of directors.  
 
In this regard, a few respondents(3) asserted that the Nominations Committee (‘NC’) 
has an important role to play. In particular, it may instigate a more deeply thought-
out nomination and appointment process which does not have to rely on networking. 
Furthermore, an internal evaluation of top management by such Committee should 
indicate the most capable and suitable individuals for the role of EDs. The NC, 
through its active processing, may also easily be in a position to recommend 
competent individuals for non-executive directorship roles. Unfortunately, the study 
indicates that as yet, most companies do not have such a Committee, as is confirmed 
by recent literature. This points towards the need to consider making NCs 
compulsory in the Maltese Listing Rules in the same manner as Audit Committees.  
 
4.3 The Third Ingredient: Board Expertise  
 
4.3.1  Is it formal qualifications vs experience? 
Interviewees (17) were unanimous in that a mix of professional qualifications is 
considered crucial for Boards to fulfil their duties effectively and efficiently. This is 
line with the arguments put forth by O’Sullivan (2009), the EU Commission (2011), 
Cox and Blake (1991), and Gaur et al. (2015). Furthermore, having such a mix 
creates a competitive advantage (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000). 
 
Formal qualifications and experience do not have to be alternative forms of 
expertise, as some respondents seem to imply. The fact that some MLCs still have a 
number of directors who do not hold any professional qualifications indicates that 
such qualifications are as yet not considered crucial in the appointment or election of 
directors, and this confirms the findings of Azzopardi (2012). Yet, the question 
arises, why, in so far as is possible, are directors not required to have both formal 
qualifications and experience? Probably this could be the optimal way to ensure that 
a Board, even a smaller one, is composed of a “diversity of knowledge, judgment and 
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experience”, as recommended by the Code. All interviewees(17) maintained that a 
director endowed with both qualifications and experience may be a rarity, but 
probably headhunting beyond “the golden boys” could result in unexpected gains.  
 
Furthermore, when determining whether a director is fit and proper, the MFSA, as 
regulator, needs to go beyond the qualifications and experience of the individual 
director. It also needs to examine how far such personal attributes are compatible 
with those of the rest of the Board. In particular, the regulator could probably do 
well to pay particular attention to the overall mix of expertise where most of the 
directors are appointed by the major shareholders who, as also indicated earlier by 
Muscat (2007), tend to give too little attention to the range of expertise.  
 
4.3.2 Is director expertise to be regulated? 
Maltese law does not specify any minimum professional qualifications or experience 
to become a director. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents(12) were against any 
new regulatory requirements for minimum qualifications or experience. 
Furthermore, Muscat (2007) contended that such a requirement, particularly that 
relating to experience, would be both impracticable and difficult to monitor.  
 
Being fit and proper, as required by the regulator, translates itself into being “honest, 
competent and solvent”. To date, the competent authority fails to objectively define 
what constitutes a competent director, merely stating that this varies with the 
position a person holds and the “relevant circumstances”. The question that follows 
concerns the manner in which the MFSA is to appropriately judge the competence of 
a potential candidate if there are no clearer, more objective specifications than this. 
As already stated, the fitness and properness of the Board as a whole also still does 
not seem to be given its due importance. Possibly, the MFSA might be more 
strongly empowered by law to compel Boards, which may be deficient as a whole in 
such fitness and properness, to temporarily engage a number of consultants in order 
to ensure that the required skill gaps are filled in. 
 
4.4 The Fourth Ingredient: Gender Diversity  
 
4.4.1 How relevant is gender diversity?   
Despite the extensive literature highlighting the importance of having a gender 
diverse Board, interviewees(17) were unanimously against any requirement with 
regards to the mix of female and male Board members as it is considered “of no use, 
as competence is not related to gender”. Probably, few companies realise what they 
have missed until they opt for such diversity.  
 
Board competence is highly related to one’s vision and experience in life. Placing 
together a team of men and women should result in wider perspectives and 
challenges with respect to various issues such as priorities in decision-making, the 
life/work balance, ethics and even a company’s vision, mission and ultimately 
strategy.  
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4.4.2  Female board participation to be improved? 
As confirmed by the European Commission (2016), Malta has the lowest presence 
of female Board members. This is not a surprise given the lack of importance given 
to gender diversity by a few of the interviewees(4) as well as the failure of the Code 
to address the importance of gender diversity. A number of respondents(6) took the 
position that the weak representation of females on Boards in Malta may be 
probably attributed to historical and cultural reasons, which are now being 
increasingly challenged. Furthermore, the recent introduction of free childcare and 
increased emphasis on teleworking are additional motivating factors for women 
returners.  
 
Yet, while such recent public measures may encourage improvement in female 
Board participation, this is clearly not enough. The same report (European 
Commission, 2016) has also remarked that Malta is one of the few countries which 
does not have any national measures in place to promote the presence of women on 
Boards. The majority of respondents(15) were against the introduction of any gender 
quotas, and this is due to the fact that women may be elected to the Boards not 
exclusively on the basis of merit. However, it must be kept in mind, that such quotas 
are only a necessary evil, or rather a temporary measure to ensure that change does 
occur within the foreseeable future. In order not to undermine the quality and 
effectiveness of the Board, as claimed by many respondents(7) in the study, specific 
measures could be taken, such as requiring formal qualifications in the case of those 
making use of the quota mechanism. Furthermore, quotas need to be limited to a 
small percentage of the Board size, say a maximum of two out of a Board of seven.   
 
Another issue is the need for adequately changing the regulatory framework so as to 
encourage Boards to become much more diverse. Thus, an alternative to requiring 
quotas in the law is that of changing the Code itself, which by addressing such issue 
of gender diversity may, with its more voluntarily comply-or-explain principle, 
generate less resistance towards adhering to quotas.  
 
Finally, more public investment in awareness and education on gender equality may 
be helpful, as it would ultimately help to change employers’ and shareholders’ 
attitudes towards more acceptance of female members on the Board. 
 
4.5 The Final Ingredient: Dealing with Chairperson/CEO Duality  
 
4.5.1 Are the roles o the chairperson and the CEO to be separate? 
The Code proposes that the roles of the chairperson and CEO need to be separate to 
ensure that no one person has "unfettered powers of discretion" and to distinguish 
the Board’s leadership from the management of the company. Yet, one of the 
provisos of the Code later allows the combination of the two roles, if an adequate 
justification is provided. If separating the two roles is so crucial, and given that the 
Code has a comply-or-explain principle, why is there is a specific provision that with 
an adequate explanation, one may combine? Such flexibility allows power-hungry 
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individuals to occupy both roles with little, if any, resistance. However, even with no 
duality of roles, the CEO may still wield significant influence on the Board, 
especially if s/he has been chosen by the Board itself. One reason for this is that the 
Board may be very much dependant on the information provided by the CEO and 
his/her subordinates. In fact, the matter was controversial with almost half of the 
respondents(7) taking the position that the separation of the two roles is to be made 
mandatory. However, while there still exists dangers to having a separate 
chairperson and CEO, the problems are probably aggravated when the two roles are 
combined.  
 
4.5.2 What positions are the chairpeson and CEO to hold on the  board? 
Most interviewees (13), in line with the Code, recommended that the chairperson is 
to hold an independent non-executive role. As stated by Wilson (2008), a non-
executive chair is more likely to focus on Board issues rather than wander onto daily 
management issues. Furthermore, a number of interviewees (5) argued that a non-
executive chair is better able to execute the Board’s control, service and strategic 
functions, albeit possibly suffering knowledge deficit when compared to an 
executive chair. On the other hand, one could argue in favour of an executive 
chairperson, other than the CEO, which would still be in line with the Code 
recommendation favouring the separation of the two roles. However, in such a case, 
a power struggle between the executive chair and CEO may potentially arise and be 
harmful to the company.  
 
However, the Code does not make any reference to the CEO’s role in the Board, 
particularly, whether the CEO is or is not to be a Board member. As has been 
indicated in the literature, a number of arguments exist both in favour and against 
this. This is a contentious issue. In fact, the findings indicate a general reluctance on 
the part of companies towards having the CEO as a Board member, with most 
respondents (11) contending that s/he should be an ex-officio participant, either on a 
regular basis or on call as required. This is necessary in order to ensure that Board 
members are provided with the necessary knowledge and expertise needed for them 
to take an informed decision. However, a few respondents(3) noted that if the CEO is 
a regular ex-officio participant, this may give rise to conflicts of interest, as also 
confirmed in the literature (Council on Foundations, 2010). Thus, they contended 
that it would be better if the CEO is only a participant upon invitation as this will 
give the chairperson the right to exclude the CEO from the meetings when potential 
conflicts of interest arise. Contrastingly, a number of interviewees (6) argued that 
the CEO is to be a Board member to place an element of onus and accountability on 
the CEO. Perhaps one way out of this dilemma is for the legal liability of the CEO to 
be specified more clearly in the regulatory framework, particularly the CA. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This study concludes that the Maltese regulatory framework, with respect to Board 
composition, is still lax and clearly needs to be tightened so as to spur more rigorous 
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implementation on the part of those responsible of CG. However, there seems to be 
a general strong resistance to change.  
 
While Maltese law stipulates the minimum number of directors, there is no reference 
to any Board size capping. Indeed, if such capping were to be strictly established by 
law for all MLCs, this would probably signify the imposition of a harmful and much 
resented one-size-fits-all approach. Flexibility is therefore needed in this connection. 
Too small a Board is likely to suffer from a lack of expertise, while if too large, a 
Board is likely to be rendered unmanageable and inefficient. The key is therefore for 
the company to determine its Board size in a way that ensures an adequate collective 
competence and willingness for the Board to be effective, and to take into account 
company size, scope and range of operations, along with best CG practices. 
 
The concept of director independence seems to be quite complex and ambiguous, 
with much controversy as to who is and what makes a Board member truly 
independent. More regulatory clarity is required in this respect. While, admittedly it 
is much easier to be prescriptive about independence in appearance than 
independence of mind, yet, the CG regulatory framework probably needs to include 
much more emphasis on the latter. Specifically, distinctions among the different 
types of directors – EDs, NEDs and INEDs – need to be carefully made, clearly 
defining where the lines between each type are to be drawn.   
 
With respect to Board expertise, the study concludes that, despite the fact that 
companies acknowledge the importance of having a Board composed of Board 
members holding a mix of professional qualifications, they strongly resist any legal 
requirements in this respect. The general view is that experience is much more 
valuable than qualifications, even to the extent that qualifications are too often 
ignored.  
 
MLC Boards also have a low presence of female Board members, with gender 
diversity not being given any priority. The study concludes that the benefits of 
having a diverse Board are rarely appreciated, with the current impetus being that of 
looking narrowly at the quality of the individual Board member rather than the 
composite skillset of the whole Board.  
 
A final conclusion of the study is that with regards to the chairperson/CEO links, the 
roles of the chairperson and CEO are separated in most MLCs. Yet, probably the 
best arrangements need to consist of a non-executive chairperson and a separate 
CEO, the latter normally participating in Board matters, but such participation is to 
remain subject to Board invitation.  
 
There exists no optimal Board composition as there is no one single model of CG. 
Nonetheless, it is paramount to thoroughly consider the various aspects of Board 
composition within the context of each MLC and its operations in order to determine 
the composition which is best suited to each Board. Furthermore, in order to remain 
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competitive and flourish, organisations clearly need to comprehend and appreciate 
the significance of enhancing their CG practices. However, for CG practices to be 
effective, it is not enough that MLCs subject themselves to self-regulation. There is 
also the need for the competent authorities to carry out the relevant statutory changes 
so as to improve the quality of regulation, and not just increase its quantity 
(Baldacchino, 2007; 2017). After all, regulation is the cake recipe and, as stated by 
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